Author Topic: Computermix, Ipquarx, and Cca - CBM being hacked into to steal keys [chat+pics]  (Read 43493 times)

Can we just pass by this? I found out about this more than a month ago. Nothing has happened, Let's just stop.

Anybody saying that only the last three digits of the keys were cracked obviously don't understand something very important:
There is no secret formula to solving the sections of a real authentication, however, the first five digits are systematically obtained based on your BL_ID and the rest of the digits are randomly generated.

I am getting a major facepalm every time I see people say that they are fine because they only have the last three digits. No they don't. They have your full key.
Someone decrypted the key.dats because they already knew an authentication that was inside one of them, and obtained the keys. It's not a hard concept to understand.

I can easily say that computermix and his posse have the capability to decrypt keys, and so do other people that are script kiddies.
Probably not MoR. He was only known for DDoS attacks. (as far as I know)

...and so do other people that are script kiddies.
ouch lol

they already knew an authentication that was inside one of them, and obtained the keys. It's not a hard concept to understand.
and you know this how? this sounds like total speculation to me.

and you know this how? this sounds like total speculation to me.
When you are decrypting, there is a technique that allows it to work.
Not entirely sure how it works, I've never seen someone do it, but basically knowing a portion or what's inside one of the key.dats can allow you to solve what's inside of another.
I think you can actually find a webpage about it somewhere online. I was told this by Trinick or Slicksilver555.

Oh, yeah. You can decrypt a key file on a computer that you have access to. That's not quite the same thing as being able to "decrypt any key" though.

Oh dear.

Well, if something happens, I do have an alt. :/

Double post; so from my understanding, it is still unclear as to whether or not the full keys have been stolen (some say yes, some say no)?

I'm going to guess in the chance they haven't been, removing myself from CBM's service isn't going to do me any good.  It'd be too late for that, cause they already have my key.dat?

Double post; so from my understanding, it is still unclear as to whether or not the full keys have been stolen (some say yes, some say no)?

I'm going to guess in the chance they haven't been, removing myself from CBM's service isn't going to do me any good.  It'd be too late for that, cause they already have my key.dat?
They don't have the full keys.

They don't have the full keys.
I've come to believe this, since it's been a full month since the hackers revealed the picture in OP, and possibly even longer since the actual hacking event, they would have done something with the full keys if they had them. Literally anything, sell them, troll with him, blackmail the owners of the keys, etc. But absolutely nothing has happened. They're just trying to fearmonger everyone and it worked.

For those "confused":

Background knowledge required:

Key.dat files are the result of a formula that takes your key and several computer specs (including netwok properties I believe) of the machine it is generated on. This is an intentional security measure implemented by Badspot so a malicious user cannot simply copy and paste your key.dat file into their own Blockland folder to authenticate as you.

It is possible to find out how your computer's specs influenced the formula if you have both a key and its respective key.dat file. This was proven by Trinick and used to aid several users on the Help board in recovering an old key they still had the key.dat file of, as well as a known key and corresponding key.dat file generated on the same computer as the other key.dat file.

The characters ".." (two periods/full stops) represent "up a directory" in file path syntax.

Conclusions you can draw:

The directory traversal attack or whatever mentioned in the quoted post below was most likely a simple use of a relative file path to access other Blockland folders on the single FTP server CBM host uses. Obviously, this is a security flaw, as you should not be able to access other users files, but it is what it is.
My server was hacked and exploited with a directory traversal attack according to my source (which has since been fixed) and they got the key.dat files,

Now, you'll note I only quoted part of his post. He then goes on to say "but they were unable to get the full keys." You can ignore this, because the situation is that they either got none of the key or they got the whole key, and clearly they have a part of it as proven by several users who actually own the keys posting confirmation in this thread.

And, if you made note of the part I bolded earlier in this post, it is entirely possible for them to have the whole key. I mentioned you need three criteria to extract a key from a key.dat file:

1) The target key.dat file -- Obtained through the poor security Cowboy6 mentioned
2) A known key
3) A key.dat generated from the known key on the same machine as the target key.dat file

To fulfill #2 and #3, the malicious user simply signed up for CBM host. Of course, they know their own key. Upon authenticating their Blockland install on CBM, they can also access the key.dat file that was generated in the folder of their server.

 :nes: I've said "malicious user" because I haven't read the replies in detail and don't care to, so if you know conclusively who owns the image in the OP then you can just substitute in their name and consider them guilty. It is not by some hacking miracle that this was possible, which apparently a lot of people were having trouble believing. Anyone passing of the event as a non-issue is most likely involved, whether directly or just not wanting their friends who were involved to be punished.

Probable question:

If the criteria to reverse a key.dat file is so easy to fulfill, why hasn't this been exploited before? The big one is #3. You need the same computer as your target. Not same model, same computer. Like they'd have to come to your house and play Blockland, at which point the security of a single file on your computer is the least of your problems. Or, as was shown in this instance, share a (remote) computer without any guaranteed trust between the users.

tl;dr read the line that starts with the :nes:

Why weren't user directories on Cowboy's server set up properly? They should never have been able to access other users' files.


Because it's free?
being a free service has no relation to what greek was saying

Well, considering it's a no-benefit service, there are obviously parts of it you skim on and because of that, security holes that get over-looked. That and paid services are the things that last long enough to patch all of the security holes like this one. That being said, i am glad that Cowboy seems to be receiving enough donations to stick around.

Not exactly implying that it's impossible for a non-beneficial service to become fool-proof (in the IT area) but that is a rare sight.
Maybe someone can make sense of my loopy rambling.